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Abstract 
Pay-for-performance programs offering additional payments to GPs can be used not only to 
improve the quality of care but also for cost containment purposes. In this paper, we analyse the 
impact of removing financial incentives in primary care that were aimed at containing hospital 
expenditure in the Italian region of Emilia Romagna during the period 2002-04. Our analysis 
draws on regional databanks linking GPs’ characteristics to those of their patients (including all 
sources of public payments made to GPs), together with information on the utilisation of 
hospital services. We employ a difference-in-difference specification to assess changes in 
expenditures for avoidable and total hospital admissions. We identify the treatment group with 
GPs operating in districts where the program is withdrawn during the observation period 
(“Leavers”). Their performance is compared to that of two separate control groups, namely: GPs 
working in districts that grant incentives for the entire period (“Stayers”), and those working in 
districts that never introduced measures for the containment of hospitalisations (“Non 
Participants”).  
The comparison between treatment and control groups shows that removing incentives does not 
result in a worse performance by Leavers compared to both control groups. This supports the 
policy of removing incentives, as such entail extra payments to GPs which, however, do not 
seem capable of significantly influencing their behaviour in the desired ways. Our findings 
complement previous evidence from the same institutional context showing that only those 
programs that aim to improve disease management for specific conditions - rather than to 
simply contain expenditure - have proven successful in reducing avoidable admissions for the 
target population.  
 
Key words: Health economics, primary care, hospital expenditure, ambulatory care sensitive 
conditions, economic incentives.  
JEL classification: I11, I18, C31 
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1. Introduction 
Publicly-funded health systems are increasingly struggling to improve the efficiency of resource 
allocation through cost-conscious decisions by health professionals and institutions, because of 
the widening gap between health needs and available resources. At the same time, cost 
containment must be weighed against its possible adverse effects on health outcomes. 
Consequently, initiatives for improving the incentives offered to healthcare providers are 
currently a central concern for health-policy makers. 
Ensuring the effectiveness of the design of incentives first involved the hospital sector, due to 
its organisational complexity, the concentration of (often irreversible) physical and human 
capital investment, the severe case-mix, all of which calling for the careful planning and 
implementation of service provision. More recently, a number of other critical areas have 
emerged, including the coordination between primary and secondary care. This is a consequence 
of hospitals’ increasing specialisation in the provision of acute care, which has implied the 
transfer of responsibility for low-intensity treatments to the district level. Moreover, General 
Practitioners (GPs) provide assistance in areas such as preventive care, chronic diseases and 
post-acute follow ups. Consequently, their role as both providers and gatekeepers is essential to 
the appropriate utilisation of the different levels of care and to the reconciling of cost-
containment policies with successful outcomes. 
GPs’ remuneration schemes, based exclusively on capitation, are considered not to be fully 
effective in inducing optimal professional effort on the part of the GPs themselves [Iversen & 
Luras 2006]. Given that educational strategies alone, such as guidelines and protocols, have not 
proven completely successful [Grilli et al. 2000], economic incentives such as Pay-for-
Performance (P4P) programs often represent additional means by which to reinforce the 
governance of healthcare delivery. Usually, they add up to capitation and reward high quality 
care, as well as the achievement of specific policy targets. 
In the present paper, we study the impact of incentives provided to GPs for containing levels of 
hospital expenditure in the Italian region of Emilia Romagna. The main purpose of these P4P 
programs is cost containment rather than improvement in the quality of care, and they are 
grounded in the belief that capitation can result in suboptimal professional performance when 
GPs see patients at the ambulatory level. This may result in referral to secondary-care facilities 
even if patients’ conditions do not strictly require hospitalisation. As long as additional rewards 
increase GPs’ efforts, one would expect a reduction in the utilisation of hospital services, 
especially for conditions that can be effectively treated in a primary care setting. 
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In Emilia Romagna, primary care incentives are managed independently by each district, which 
can decide whether to use such incentives, which clinical areas or targets to prioritise, and how 
much funding to give to each area. As a matter of fact, their use varies greatly among districts 
but once the Health District (HD) and the GPs’ organisations agree upon a particular program, 
all GPs working in a district become eligible. This institutional feature ensures that our 
empirical analysis does not suffers of individual voluntary selection into the programs. 
At the start of our observation period, we document a number of ongoing  initiatives designed to 
reward GPs for containing the recourse to hospital services by their listed patients. The 
incentives in question constitute only a fraction of the additional payments payable to GPs, 
since different objectives (e.g. the improved management of chronic illness) are in many cases  
incentivised by means of other programs. Following the pioneering period when P4P programs 
were first introduced, our data span a subsequent period characterised by the reorganisation of 
some of these schemes. One of the reasons for this reorganisation was the increasing scepticism 
regarding the effectiveness of programs specifically designed to contain hospitals’ spending. 
Such scepticism led certain HDs to end these programs during the period of observation. Others 
did likewise in later years, and no such program is  ongoing  at present. Unfortunately, we only 
have a full dataset for a limited number of years, during which such programs were ended in a 
subset of HDs. Among other things, these programs were ended due to the fact that focusing on 
the financial implications of service utilisation, rather than on health improvements and disease 
management, was seen to generate negative feedback on GPs’ motivations and involvement, 
which could have undermined the effectiveness of the programs themselves. The present work 
exploits this policy change in order to evaluate the implications of the removal of financial 
incentives to containing hospitalisations in Emilia Romagna during the period 2002-04. We use  
this policy shift as a natural experiment in order to empirically assess the influence of financial 
incentives on GPs’ behaviour and to provide useful policy indications for the design of payment 
schemes.  
Our study draws on administrative data linking GPs’ characteristics (including all sources of 
professional income) with the utilisation of hospital services by registered patients. This enables 
us to establish whether programs for reducing hospitalisation levels were in fact ongoing in a 
given district and year. Consequently, we identify all those GPs within our sample who were 
eligible for an incentive program aimed at containing hospital expenditure. We use a difference-
in-difference (DID) approach in order to remove potential sources of bias when assessing the 
influence of P4P programs on physicians’ activities. 
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Two specific features distinguish our case from standard natural experiments recently used to 
investigate the responses of primary care providers to changes in the incentive system (e.g. 
Nolan 2008, Dumont et al. 2008, Layte et al. 2009). Firstly, instead of the introduction of an 
incentive-based program, we consider the consequences of its closure. Behavioural evidence, 
supported by lab and field experiments, suggests that penalties and premiums may not always 
affect individual choices symmetrically (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). Within our specific 
framework, non-symmetric reactions to the introduction/removal of incentives may stem from 
clinical practices that are costly to change once they have been adopted. Therefore, removing 
financial incentives may not necessarily see physicians return to previous styles of practice. A 
less optimistic hypothesis suggests that if the use of financial incentives crowds out intrinsic 
motivations, their subsequent removal could further reduce intrinsic motivations, causing a 
reduction in effort and productivity below the pre-existing level (Camerer, 2010). Nowadays, 
many programs have been operating for several years, and this raises questions about how 
existing schemes can be modified in order to improve their effectiveness and to bring them in 
line with new policy priorities. Consequently, gaining an insight into the specific implications of 
removing incentive-based programs - or parts thereof - is of particular interest to policymakers. 
The second distinguishing feature of our analysis is that while the treatment group is  
exclusively identified with those GPs working in districts where the program had been closed 
(“Leavers”), two alternative control groups are taken into consideration. The first of these 
consists of GPs working in districts that provide the aforesaid incentives for the entire period 
(“Stayers”), while the second includes GPs working in districts that did not introduce any 
specific program for containing hospitalisations (“Non Participants”). In principle, it is always 
possible that the units characterised by the same initial conditions as the treated ones, 
representing the natural control group (Stayers), may not fully control for unobservable factors. 
Given this possibility, the addition of a second control group, which is usually not available in 
policy evaluation studies, can reinforce the robustness of empirical analysis, provided that the 
two comparisons lead to similar conclusions. 
 
2. Background Literature 
Due to the fact that financial incentives in primary care can improve practice behaviour, a 
variety of pay-for-performance programs (P4P) have been established worldwide [e.g. 
Rosenthal et al. 2005; Mullen et al. 2010; Lester et al., 2010 for the US; Li et al., 2011 for 
Canada; Scott et al., 2009 for Australia]. In the British NHS, studies have focused on the UK’s 
Quality and Outcomes Framework, in order to assess trends in quality indicators before and 
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after the introduction of this program [see Campbell et al. 2008, Gravelle, Sutton and Ma 2010; 
Sutton et al. 2010; Dusheiko et al., 2011]. Overall, such P4P programs have led to a broad 
debate over the impact of existing schemes and possible design improvements [Christianson et 
al., 2008; Nolan et al., 2011; Cromwell et al., 2011; Scott et al., 2011].  
To the extent that GPs operate in a setting characterised by incomplete contracts and benefit of 
informational advantages, it has been recognised that remuneration schemes can affect GPs’ 
behaviour towards alignment with the general policy goals set by the healthcare authorities 
[Dumont et al., 2008]. However, others have countered that the presence of strong medical 
ethics may dilute the influence of incentive programs [Dixit, 2002; Benabou and Tirole, 2003; 
Siciliani, 2009].  
Economic theory has outlined the strengths and weaknesses of different schemes, but the 
question of their effectiveness ultimately remains an empirical one. Until now, the evidence has 
been far from conclusive, and shows a conflicting evidence on the impact of P4P on different 
measures of the quality of care [Scott et al, 2011; Nolan et al, 2011]. This may be the 
consequence of poor policy design, but also of the lack of sufficiently long and detailed datasets 
required to identify genuine causal relations. Additional challenges stem from the organisation 
of general practices, where many confounding factors may influence physician’s response, 
including inter- and intra- country differences in remuneration systems, practice arrangements, 
non-financial incentives and case-mix [Boyden and Carter, 2000]. 
Actually, P4P schemes differ according to a variety of factors, including the identified targets, 
the monitoring of activities and the size of financial transfers. Moreover, one should also take 
into account non-pecuniary factors such as professional autonomy, altruistic concerns regarding 
patients’ health, and other demographic, socioeconomic and organisational characteristics 
[Chaix-Couturier et al. 2000].  
Most programs are designed to improve the quality of care, but some have also been used to 
contain health expenditure. Among the studies that investigate the question of whether P4P in 
primary care can influence hospital use, Lee et al. (2010) find in Taiwan a significant reduction 
in inpatient admissions and diabetes-related hospital expenditure for patients whose physicians 
were enrolled in a P4P disease management program; similar results are obtained by Chen et al. 
(2010) in Hawaii, whereas Mullen et al.(2010) in California show no significant change in 
avoidable admissions following the introduction of an incentive program covering a range of 
clinical quality measures. Dusheiko et al. (2011) analyse cross-sectional and panel data to 
examine whether  the improved management of ten chronic diseases in primary care lead to any 
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reduction in hospital costs in the UK. They find a significant drop in total hospital expenditure 
only for practice stroke care. 
As for the policy measures specifically analysed in this paper, there has been very little 
empirical evidence regarding the effects of removing financial incentives from physicians’ 
payment schemes. One exception is the study by Lester et al. (2010) on the effects of removal of 
a number of financial incentives offered to medical facilities, rather than to individual 
physicians, in the HMO Kaiser Permanente in California. In this case, the closure of certain 
programs was not expected to modify the total funding available for the facilities in question. 
Results show that removing a set of incentives results in a reduction in performance levels 
compared to those reached when operating under the incentive scheme.  
Finally, the present work ought to be compared to a number of related papers assessing the role 
of financial incentives within the same institutional context considered here. Lippi Bruni et al. 
(2009) and Iezzi et al. (2011) both study the impact of diabetes management incentives in 
Emilia Romagna offered for programs promoting the assumption of responsibility of chronic 
patients by GPs. Both works outline a significant reduction in avoidable hospitalisations for the 
target population. Fiorentini et al. (2011) do not focus on a specific set of incentives as we do 
here, but analyse the overall impact of the total extra payments received by GPs on hospital 
referral patterns. They consider several indicators of appropriateness of care, and the only 
significant reduction in the use of hospital services is that recorded with regard to 27 medical 
DRGs that the Emilia Romagna region identifies as at risk of inappropriateness in primary care. 
 
3. Primary care and hospital expenditures in Emilia-Romagna  
In 1978, Italy set up its National Health System (NHS), a nationwide public healthcare system  
in which Regional Governments have progressively expanded their powers regarding healthcare 
service provision. More recently, fiscal decentralization has increased tax autonomy, whereby 
Regional Governments are now more financially accountable than in the past with regard to 
health spending, with substantial implications  in terms of interregional redistribution (Ferrario 
and Zanardi, 2011). 
Nationwide, primary care is organized according to a single payer, list-based system where 
family physicians do not to face multiple insurers or organizations but are directly contracted 
with the NHS. Consultations are free of charge and citizens must register with a GP who 
regulates access to public specialist and hospital care. The maximum number of listed patients 
each GP may have is 1,500, in the case of  full-time, and 800 in the case of part-time physicians, 
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although exceptions are allowed for those practitioners exceeding  the aforesaid threshold at the 
time of its introduction. 
Healthcare Districts (HDs), the smallest institutional unit within the NHS, are responsible for 
coordinating primary and outpatient care. HDs are aggregated within Local Health Authorities 
(LHAs), whose managers are directly appointed by Regional Government. LHAs and HDs are 
granted a large degree of autonomy when it comes to drafting primary care policies, including  
the possible introduction of financial incentives. Over the last decade there has been a 
generalised shift from hospital to community care, in recognition of the fact that certain 
conditions, corresponding to the principal chronic illnesses, do not always require 
hospitalisation. Although all patients are registered with a specific GP, LHAa and HDs have 
also promoted measures favouring arrangements among family physicians in order to create  
networks for the sharing of both facilities and knowledge (Fattore et al. 2009). 
The first, and most important, part of a GP’s remuneration is represented by capitation, as 
negotiated between national government and the physicians’ organisations. A second, smaller 
component is the variable part (fee-for-service) awarded for specific forms of treatment 
provided at practice level, including minor surgery and immunisation up-take for selected 
groups of patients. Both components are uniform throughout the country. Following regional- 
and district-level agreements, a third additional block can be introduced. This consists of 
financial incentives aimed at promoting specific goals established by regional and district health 
authorities. Such additional payments top up capitation often following a P4P scheme, and  may 
vary considerable both between, and within, regions. These incentives are designed in particular  
to encourage cooperation between GPs and other public healthcare providers, to promote a 
better quality of care, to contain costs and to reduce the inappropriate use of hospital resources.  
As a consequence of those objectives pursued locally, HD agreements may include various 
remunerated activities, as well as payments of a varying entity. Interestingly, once the 
agreement has been signed, all GPs are eligible for the incentives without any individual 
voluntary selection into the program. In some cases, targeted activities refer to conditions for 
which GPs are capable of influencing the quality, and the appropriate setting, of care. For 
example, some local contracts provide financial incentives in order to increase the number of 
protected hospital discharges of patients needing follow-up care, to strengthen home and 
community care for the elderly, to reward the direct provision of certain forms of treatment (e.g. 
immunisation uptake), to promote GPs’ assumption of responsibility for chronic patients (e.g. 
diabetes, hypertension), and to encourage the adoption of organisational routines designed to 
  
9 
improve cooperation among providers, such as participation in medical networks, or adherence 
to evidence-based guidelines. 
A number of other programs have also addressed expenditure targets. In this paper we actually 
consider the effects of contracts rewarding the containment of hospital expenditure, as 
implemented in certain regional districts and later removed by a subset of the latter. 
 
4. Data and estimation issues 
4.1 The data  
Our datasets draw on the population of Emilia Romagna (Italy), with a total population of 4.5 
million. The study population consists of all regional citizens between 18-65 years of age, 
observed in the period 2002-2004. The resulting dataset includes 2,936,834 patients, 3,229 GPs 
and 39 districts belonging to 11 LHAs. During the period the average number of GPs active 
each year amounts to 3,187 (std. dev. 58). 
The 39 HDs can be divided into three groups: the 8 districts providing incentives for the entire 
period (“Stayers”); the 12 districts that stopped the program during the observational period 
(“Leavers”); the 19 districts that never introduced a specific program for containing 
hospitalisations (“Non Participants”). Our estimation strategy is based on a comparison 
between “Leavers”, “Stayers” and “Non Participants”. The first is our treatment group, while 
the second and third are alternative control groups.  
Since our aim is to study the links between financial incentives in primary care and the use of 
hospital services by listed patients, we have conducted our analysis mainly on the basis of 
episodes the occurrence of which is expected to be influenced by quality of primary care. For 
this purpose, we have constructed a measure for the utilisation of hospital services that could 
have been avoided. Avoidable admissions are identified by adopting the list of Ambulatory Care 
Sensitive Conditions (ACSCs) coded using the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9-
CM) and developed by Billings et al. (1993) and Caminal et al. (2004), which has recently also 
been used  in empirical  studies that evaluate how primary care policies affect the use of hospital  
facilities [Nolan, 2011; Fiorentini et al. 2011]. We classify hospitalisations as inappropriate if at 
least one of the ICD-9-CM codes referring to ACSCs is recorded as the primary reason for 
admission. Table 1 shows all ACSCs and the associated ICD-9-CM codes. We focus primarily 
on ACSCs, since they represent the subgroup of clinical conditions that are more likely to be 
affected by GPs’ behaviour. On the contrary, for most other conditions, hospital admissions are 
deemed to be beyond the control of general practitioners. By pooling together those conditions 
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under and beyond the control of the family doctor, one may excessively dilute the effect of 
policies designed to influence practice style, which tend to induce changes in hospital 
admissions for a limited subset of conditions only, namely for  those conditions or cases which 
can be treated effectively treated in a general practice setting.  
Ambulatory Care Sensitive Condition ICD-9-CM Codes 
Angina   411.1, 411.8, 413. Excludes cases with procedure codes [01-
86.99] 
Asthma  493 
Bacterial pneumonia  481, 482.2, 482.3, 482.9, 483, 485, 486. Excludes cases with 
secondary diagnosis of sickle cell [282.6]. 
Cellulites  681, 682, 683, 686. Excludes cases with any procedure codes 
except 860 where it is the only procedure 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease  491, 492, 494, 496, 466.0 
Congestive heart failure  428, 402.01, 402.11, 402.91, 518.4 
Dehydration - volume depletion  276.5 
Diabetes  250.1, 250.2, 250.3, 250.8, 250.9, 250.0, 251 
Gangrene  785.4 
Gastroenteritis  558.9 
Grand mal status and other epileptic convulsions  345, 780.3 
Hypertension  401.0, 401.9, 402.00, 402.10, 402.90. Excludes cases with 
procedures 36.01, 36.02, 36.05, 36.1, 37.5, 37.7. 
Hypoglycemia  251.2 
Hypokalemia  276.8 
Immunization-related and preventable conditions  032, 033, 037, 045, 055, 072, 320.0, 390, 391 
Kidney/urinary infection  590, 599.0, 599.9 
Pelvic inflammatory disease  614 (Excludes 68.3-68.8) 
Peptic ulcer  [531, 532, 533] 
Pulmonary tuberculosis and other tuberculosis 011, 012-018 
Pyelonephritis  590 
Ruptured appendix 540.0, 540.1 
Severe ear, nose, and throat infections  382, 462, 463, 464, 465, 472.1 
Skin grafts with cellulitis  DRG 263, DRG 264 
 
Table 1 
 
The dependent variable that proxies utilisation of hospital resources, is the log of expenditure 
calculated from the diagnostic group assigned to each (avoidable) hospital admission, and the 
corresponding DRG tariff set by the Regional Health Authority, which remains fixed for the 
entire period (log of avoidable hospital expenditure). 
Figure 1 shows trends in total hospital expenditure, together with its disaggregation into 
avoidable and unavoidable expenditure. The validity of the DID estimator relies on the 
assumption that the trend in the dependent variable is the same for both treatment and control 
groups. Inspection of Figure 1 confirms that for our data the assumption of common trends is 
reasonable.  
 
 
  
11 
Figure 1 – Trend of total hospital expenditure and its disaggregation in reasonably avoidable 
hospital expenditure and not avoidable hospital expenditure, year 2002-2004. 
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The policy focus of the paper is on financial incentives for the containment of hospitalisations. 
For this purpose,  we have identified, the physicians working in districts that in 2002 and/or 
2004 provide incentives of the kind mentioned above. We should bear in mind that in Emilia 
Romagna, incentive-based programs are designed at the HD level, and all GPs operating within 
a particular district are eligible for the additional bonuses. Of course, for programs where 
payment is conditional on performance, some GPs may receive the bonus while others may not 
according to their results even if they work in the same district. Given this, using payments at 
the individual level – or even payment size - to indentify the impact of financial incentive on 
GPs activity, can be misleading due to the reverse causality effect. In fact, a positive bonus paid 
to a particular GP is the consequence of that GP’s meeting the predefined target, but we cannot 
infer from this whether the existence of the program caused any change in his behaviour.  
To address this problem, we utilise observed payments in order to single out those districts that 
adopted P4P programs for containing hospital expenditure, in 2002 and 2004. This allows us to 
identify if a GP operates under an incentive scheme or not, irrespectively of whether he was 
able to meet the agreed target. By doing so, we can ultimately separate treatment (Leavers) from 
control groups (Stayers and Non Participants).  
Figure 2 shows incentives for containing hospital expenditure, by group and by year. We 
present group averages calculated as a share of GPs’ annual income paid by the Regional Health 
Authority. Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of financial incentives and the fraction of GPs 
receiving financial incentives by districts, distinguishing between Stayers and Leavers for 2002 
and 2004. 
Figure 2 – Financial incentives as a percentage of GP’s annual income by groups, 2002-2004. 
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Figure 3 – Financial incentives as a percentage of GP annual income by districts (Stayers 
and Leavers), 2002-2004. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Percentage of GPs receiving financial incentives by districts (Stayers and 
Leavers), 2002-2004. 
 
 
We model the log of avoidable hospital expenditure as dependent upon a set of controls 
regarding the characteristics of both the physician and the practice. The first set of covariates 
consist of the GP’s gender, age, age squared and seniority. We also control for the type of 
practice, distinguishing between individual and group practices. 
To the extent that patients may choose the physician they wish, there is a possibility of some 
degree of self-selection, by patients with similar characteristics (e.g. a particular chronic 
disease) in the same list. Still, self-selection is not expected to be correlated with eligibility for 
financial incentives, since the choice of physician usually involves those GPs operating in the 
same area, whereas eligibility only varies across districts. In order to control for selection on 
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relevant, observable list characteristics, we include a set of patients’ characteristics extracted 
from the list such as: the share of male patients; the average age of listed patients; and the 
average Charlson index calculated from hospitalised patients. The Charlson index is a weighted 
index of comorbidity, computed from the ICD-9-CM diagnostic and procedure codes available 
in administrative datasets, according to their potential influence on the risk of mortality 
(Charlson et al., 1987; Romano et al., 1993). By doing so, we address potential biases due to 
(observable) patients’ characteristics which may affect hospital admission rates. 
In order to account for supply-side characteristics, we have included the number of ordinary 
hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants. In addition, as an indicator of market structure, we construct 
a competition index, calculated as the number of GPs per 1,000 inhabitants (Kann, Biørn, Luras, 
2010), and an index of population dependency on district hospitals, while geographical 
accessibility is proxied by population density. All these controls are entered at the district level. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our estimating sample. We observe only slight 
differences in average values between the treatment and control groups and this supports the 
validity of the identification strategy adopted. 
 
 Treatment group 
(Leavers) 
1 control group 
(Stayers) 
2 control group 
(Non participant) 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
GP gender (Male=1) 74% 0.439 71% 0.455 74% 0.436 
GP age 52 6.348 51 5.852 51 6.623 
GP age squared 2701 701.870 2615 630.456 2630 716.554 
GP seniority 17 7.702 18 7.763 17 7.615 
Practice type (associated=1) 50% 0.500 53% 0.499 57% 0.495 
List size 1156 495.153 1119 463.587 1163 506.661 
List proportion male 48% 0.038 48% 0.036 48% 0.036 
Average patient age 49 4.959 49 4.546 47 5.363 
Charlson index 0.615 0.718 0.526 0.377 0.570 0.472 
Hospital beds by population 0.0002 0.000 0.0002 0.000 0.0002 0.000 
District population density 2.044 2.181 0.352 0.441 0.457 1.227 
Competition index 0.476 0.277 0.381 0.187 0.210 0.129 
Pop_ dependency to district hospital 77.213 10.932 80.971 2.677 80.575 8.158 
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics: Treatment group and control groups,  year 2002-2004 
 
3.2 Statistical analysis 
Our aim is to estimate the effect of P4P incentives on (avoidable) hospital expenditure, by 
comparing variations across time between the treatment group and each control group. More 
precisely, we look at expenditure for avoidable hospital treatments (before and after) the ending 
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of incentive programs in the 12 districts that experienced such policy change. We specify the 
following equation: 
h
ijt
h
t
h
tjtit
h
ijt DTDTZXy µδργβββ +⋅+++++= '2'10                     (1) 
Districts (j= 1,…., 39) are grouped according to the presence of financial incentives that are 
aimed at containing hospital expenditure during the period of investigation. Given the feature of 
our dataset, they are aggregated into three groups: Leavers, Stayers and Non Participants (h= L, 
S, NP). The dependent variable hijty  is the log of (avoidable) hospital expenditure of physician i 
in year t, operating in district j which is included in group h. Vector itX contains covariates 
referring to physician i and to his list at time t; vector Zjt includes covariates referring to the 
district where each GP operates at time t; tT  is a dummy equal to 1 for observations in 2004, 
and equal to 0 otherwise (2002); hD  is a dummy equal to 1 if the physician belongs to the 
treatment group, or 0 otherwise; tT *
hD  is the interaction term that takes value 1 if physician i 
is eligible for the incentives at time t. The coefficients β1 and β2 measure the marginal effects of 
changes in GP and district variables on the log of hospital expenditure. The coefficients γ and 
ρ estimate the average impact on the log of expenditures of the observation being included the 
post treatment period and in the treatment group, respectively. The coefficient δ captures the 
most relevant policy indicator in our analysis because it measures the effect of removing the 
incentives during the second period. It multiplies the interaction term and functions as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for observations jointly belonging to the treatment group and the second 
period; hijtµ  is the idiosyncratic error term. Equation (1) is estimated by a pooled linear panel 
data model. 
We estimate hospital expenditure for the three groups: districts that provide incentives for the 
entire period ( Sijty  for “Stayers”); districts that ended the program ( Lijty for “Leavers”); districts 
that never introduced any specific program for containing hospitalisations ( NPijty for “Non 
Participants”). The expected difference in hospital expenditure changes between Leavers and 
Stayers is: 
)()( SijtLijtSL yEyEDD ∆−∆=− ,                                              (2) 
while the expected difference between Leavers and Non-Participants is: 
)()( NPijtLijtNPL yEyEDD ∆−∆=−⋅ .     (3) 
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We estimate an empty and full multivariate specification of (2) and (3). To mitigate the over-
rejection problem for DID estimates when the inference of the regular t-statistic is based on 
unadjusted standard errors, we use robust standard errors clustered at district level [Bertrand, 
Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004; Li et al. 2011]. 
 
5. Results 
Table 3 shows estimates for the DID specification with the log of avoidable hospital 
expenditures as the dependent variable. Firstly, we compared Leavers to Stayers, and then 
Leavers to Non Participants, and in each case we consider two specifications. The first one 
consists of the empty model comparing average group expenditure, while the second one is the 
multivariate specification obtained by including the controls presented in Table 2. Adding 
covariates improves the precision of the estimates, but results are  in line with the empty model. 
 
Table 3 – Difference in difference results for avoidable hospital expenditure  
 Treatment 
group 
Leavers 
Control group 
Stayers 
Between 
group 
difference 
Treatment 
group 
Leavers 
control group 
Non Participant 
Between 
group 
difference 
 Diff SD Diff SD  Diff SD Diff SD  
Empty model 
2002 11,078 (0.104) 11,016 (0.089) 0.062 (0.137) 11,078 (0.103) 11,245 (0.079) -0.167 (0.129) 
2004 10,099 (0.145) 10,066 (0.107) 0.033 (0.180) 10,099 (0.144) 10,307 (0.059) -0.208 (0.156) 
Diff-in-diff -0.029 (0.140) -0.040 (0.106) 
R2 0.08611 0.08710 
Full model 
2002 3,995 (2.008) 3,937 (1.996) 0.058 (0120) 1,997 (1.657) 2,275 (1.586) -0.278 (0.115) 
2004 3,019 (1.999) 2,888 (2.021) 0.132 (0.074) 0,997 (1.654) 1,344 (1.611) -0.347 (0.121) 
Diff-in-diff 0.074  (0.148)  -0.069 (0.102) 
R2 0.47550  0.50954 
 Coeff SD pvalue  Coeff SD pvalue  
GP gender -0.194 0.083 0.029  -0.198 0.087 0.031  
GP age -0.022 0.055 0.701  0.050 0.051 0.340  
GP age squared -0.000 0.000 0.879  -0.001 0.000 0.186  
GP seniority 0.011 0.006 0.105  0.005 0.004 0.276  
Practice type -0.046 0.045 0.318  -0.012 0.042 0.778  
List size 0.001 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000 0.000  
Proportion male 2.528 1.298 0.066  2.168 1.177 0.076  
Av_ patient age 0.120 0.009 0.000  0.122 0.009 0.000  
Charlson index 0.008 0.064 0.905  0.024 0.057 0.682  
Hospital beds  -0.001 0.000 0.031  -0.000 0.000 0.280  
Dist pop_ density -0.009 0.051 0.867  -0.032 0.032 0.325  
Competition index 0.157 0.254 0.545  0.234 0.192 0.235  
Pop_dependency -0.004 0.009 0.674  -0.005 0.005 0.331  
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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We start by comparing Leavers and Stayers. The empty model indicates that both groups reduce 
avoidable expenditures over time. The reduction in the dependent variable amounts to 9,7% for 
Leavers and to 8.6% for Stayers. In the multivariate model, the within-group difference displays  
similar trends over time although the estimated percentage reduction is larger for Stayers. In 
both specifications, the DID is not significant, however, and thus the removal of financial 
incentives does not seem to have impacted on the Leavers’ behaviour differently from what has 
happened to GPs working in districts where the incentives were maintained. 
The comparison between Leavers and Non-Participants confirms the general trend of falling 
expenditure on avoidable hospitalisations. In the empty model, the within-group time difference 
shows that Non-Participant districts reduce the resources spent on ACSCs hospitalisations by 
8.3%, whereas this reduction was slightly larger among Leavers (9.7%). If we consider 
between-group differences, Non-Participant districts display a higher expenditure level in both 
years and the gap slightly increases over time. Similar findings hold for the multivariate model. 
Consistently with the previous case, the DID estimation shows that removing financial 
incentives has not significantly changed the difference between treated observations and 
controls.  
Overall, the impact produced by the ending of P4P programs, does not display any significant 
differential effect between the districts affected by the change in the incentive programs and any 
of the control group considered. We observe a generalised decreasing trend in avoidable 
expenditures but such variations are similar between groups despite the change in the incentive 
structure over time. Such evidence indicates that the programs that were removed do not seem 
to have effectively influenced physicians’ behaviour.  
However, referrals for ACSCs represent only a small fraction of total hospital admissions 
(Figure 1), and HDs usually set targets according to overall use of hospital services, without 
distinguishing between avoidable and unavoidable cases. Therefore, as a robustness check, we 
have re-estimated the model by including expenditure for all hospitalizations as a dependent 
variable and results are reported in table 4.   
  
18 
 
Table 4 – Difference in difference results for total hospital expenditure  
 Treatment 
group 
Leavers 
Control group 
Stayers 
Between 
group 
difference 
Treatment 
group 
Leavers 
Control group 
Non participant 
Between 
group 
difference 
 Diff SD Diff SD  Diff SD Diff SD  
Empty model 
2002 13.144 (0.020) 13.192 (0.028) -0.048 (0.035) 13.144 (0.036) 13.153 (0.028) -0.009 (0.046) 
2004 13.173 (0.020) 13.286 (0.028) -0.113 (0.034) 13.173 (0.040) 13.161 (0.030) 0.012 (0.050) 
Diff-in-diff -0.065 (0.049) 0.021 (0.025) 
R2 0.00461 0.00023 
Full model 
2002 8.032 (0.335) 8.054 (0.312) -0.023 (0.041) 8.653 (0.463) 8.692 (0.454) -0.039 (0.032) 
2004 8.070 (0.338) 8.122 (0.318) -0.051 (0.032) 8.689 (0.466) 8.723 (0.455) -0.034 (0.032) 
Diff-in-diff -0.029 (0.018) 0.005 (0.016) 
R2 0.84489 0.84593 
 Coeff SD pvalue  Coeff SD pvalue  
GP gender -0.087 0.019 0.000  -0.072 0.024 0.006  
GP age 0.035 0.012 0.010  0.018 0.015 0.230  
GP age squared -0.000 0.000 0.004  -0.000 0.000 0.085  
GP seniority 0.000 0.001 0.727  0.001 0.001 0.346  
Practice type -0.002 0.014 0.901  0.004 0.012 0.739  
List size 0.001 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000 0.000  
Proportion male 0.684 0.309 0.039  0.373 0.320 0.254  
Av_ patient age 0.056 0.002 0.000  0.058 0.003 0.000  
Charlson index 0.027 0.015 0.086  0.034 0.015 0.030  
Hospital beds  -0.000 0.000 0.734  0.000 0.000 0.123  
Dist pop_ density -0.012 0.006 0.051  -0.022 0.008 0.012  
Competition index -0.002 0.042 0.960  0.013 0.040 0.746  
Pop_dependency 0.002 0.001 0.264  -0.001 0.002 0.634   
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
For both Stayers and Leavers, the within-group difference in the empty model  reveals a slight 
positive trend in total hospital expenditure. Opposite time trends between total and avoidable 
expenditure indicate that the rate of inappropriate use of hospital resources has fallen over time. 
The between-group difference shows that in 2002 the Leavers’ districts had a lower level of 
hospital expenditure than the Stayers did, and this difference increased over time: removing 
financial incentives widened the gap between the two groups, although in the opposite  direction 
to what one would have expected, since the rate of growth in spending in the group that ends the 
incentives (Leavers) is lower than that of the group that was still granted additional 
remuneration for curbing the use of hospital services (Stayers). Nevertheless, once again we 
find that the effect is not significant. Introducing covariates to control for differences in 
observable characteristics between the two groups does no modify the results in a qualitative 
sense. 
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The comparison of Leavers with  Non-Participants confirms the presence of a common  upward 
trend in total expenditure over time., Shifting the focus from avoidable to overall 
hospitalisations confirms the non-significance of the effect of ending the incentive programs, in 
both the empty and full specifications. This is not surprising since the latter dependent variable 
is expected to be relatively less influenced by GPs’ decisions than the former.. 
In conclusion, according to our DID estimates, the adoption of total hospital expenditure as a 
dependent variable does not modify our main policy conclusion, according to which financial 
incentives seem to exert no influence on GPs’ behaviour. Considering a dependent variable that 
cover a larger set of conditions displays changes in the time trend of expenditures, but, once 
again, no significant difference is detected across groups.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
The intense debate over the role of monetary incentives in improving the quality of primary care 
is a consequence of the growing number of P4P programs worldwide. Relatively less attention 
has been paid to the implications of programs explicitly designed to contain costs. Moreover, 
empirical studies have almost exclusively focused on physicians’ responses following the 
introduction of incentives. Now that several programs have been operating for nearly a decade 
or even more, the need to improve policy design requires an insight into the effects of removing 
some programs, or parts thereof, as well. Such removal may be stimulated by changes in policy 
priorities, or by the belief that certain aspects of the programs are not very effective, or indeed 
may produce unintended, dysfunctional consequences.  
We have analysed the impact of removing programs offering cash bonuses to GPs in exchange 
for containing hospital expenditure in Italy’s Emilia Romagna region over the period 2002-04. 
We have estimated DID models comparing changes in hospital expenditure, both for 
ambulatory care-sensitive conditions and for overall hospitalisations. GPs operating in districts 
that removed their incentives during the period of observation constitute our treatment group. 
Changes in expenditure for their listed patients are compared with those for patients residing in 
districts that maintained their programs and also with expenditure on patients residing in 
districts where no similar program was ever introduced.  
We show that the removal of incentives designed to contain hospitalisations did not produce any 
significant difference in performance between the treatment and control groups in terms of 
either of the dimensions considered here (avoidable and overall hospitalisations). The empirical 
evidence lends support to the decision of those DHAs that closed down their programs, as these 
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programs guaranteed monetary transfers to GPs without influencing their behaviour in the 
desired direction.  
This finding is noteworthy especially when compared with the impact produced by other 
measures introduced in Emilia Romagna during that same period, which were expressly 
designed to improve the quality of service provision. For example, it has been shown [Lippi 
Bruni et al. 2009, Iezzi et al. 2011] that incentives rewarding the assumption of responsibility 
(and a set of related tasks) for patients affected by chronic diseases such as type II diabetes, 
ultimately reduced the probability of recourse to hospital care by the target population for 
avoidable conditions. As has been seen in other countries (Li et al., 2011, Mullen et al. 2010), 
our findings suggest that GPs react to certain incentives, but not to others. One possible lesson 
that can be drawn here with regard to future policy design, is that incentives explicitly designed 
to contain costs prove to be less effective than those promoting improvements in care delivery 
by rewarding additional patient follow-up. This result is consistent with the idea that the 
effectiveness of additional remuneration may suffer if such bonus payments, instead of 
reinforcing the physician-patient relationship, are perceived as shifting physicians’ attention 
from patients’ health towards the pursuit of general financial targets. 
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